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The Fault in Legal Ethics*
Anthony T. Kronman**
Two old and antagonistic traditions of thought shape the
modern field of legal ethics. One of these has its beginnings in
Aristotle's political philosophy, and the other in the contractarian
theories of Hobbes and Locke. Both traditions influenced the
design of the American republic, whose founders combined
elements from each in a new and volatile synthesis marked by
tensions that have been a part of our public life ever since. Our
view of the legal profession - of what lawyers do and ought to do
- is the product of a similarly unstable combination of elements
drawn from these two traditions, and many of the most familiar and
seemingly intractable disagreements within the field of legal ethics,
the fault lines along which opinion seems forever to divide, are a
consequence of the effort to join, in a single view of the lawyer's
role, such strikingly different conceptions of political morality.
At different moments in our history, one of these traditions
has been more influential than the other. In the early years of the
republic, it was the Aristotelian conception of the lawyer's role the republican conception - that dominated the discussion of
professional ethics. In the last half century, the contractarian
conception has achieved a comparable intellectual and moral
dominance. There are signs that this may now be changing, that
the influence of republican ideas is once again growing within the
field of legal ethics. I shall have more to say about this later in my
talk. But first I need to define my terms, to tell you what I mean
by the republican and contractarian traditions, and to explain how
these traditions and the conflict between them have shaped our
complex and unstable understanding of what lawyers do.

* © 1996 Anthony T. Kronman.
** This article was originally prepared for a conference on legal ethics that was held

at Hofstra University from March 10-12, 1996. I am grateful to Professors Roy Simon and
Monroe Freedman for their invitation to speak at the conference, and for their permission
to publish my remarks here.
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At the beginning of his treatise on politics, from which the
whole tradition of republican political philosophy derives, Aristotle
makes a famous claim about the value of political action. To lead
a complete human life, he says, a person must participate in the
political affairs of his city; he must play an active role in its
government and in the administration of its laws. Someone who
devotes himself entirely to the private affairs of his household and
to the business of making money - to economic life, which
Aristotle considered merely an extension of household activity misses out, he says, on an experience that is essential to human
fulfillment, the experience of sharing the responsibilities of political
rule with a group of fellow citizens who, unlike the other members
of one's household - the women and children and slaves possess a capacity for independent action equal to one's own. For
Aristotle, this experience is unique to human beings - animals are
incapable of political rule and the gods possess too much independence for it. The life of a man who has no share in the government of his city thus lacks a defining human element. It is a life
either of beastly necessity (as it is for those who spend all their
time on household matters) or one of divine independence (which
only heroes with godlike powers ever experience) but in neither
case is it a life of a distinctly human kind, with the sort of fulfillment that human beings alone enjoy.
To this first claim Aristotle joins a second. A city, he says, is
more than a group of people living together for their mutual
material advantage. It is a system of laws that embodies a conception of right living, a shared view of the most appropriate way for
human beings to conduct themselves in their relations with one
another and with the gods. A city is an association held together
by a set of laws that embodies, as we would say today, a conception
of the good, and if any such association is to outlast its foundation,
if it is to endure for a meaningful length of time, some among its
members (a sufficient number, however many that may be) must
feel an allegiance to it and be prepared to sacrifice themselves on
its behalf. If a city is to survive, some of its citizens must possess
the self-sacrificing habit of devotion that we commonly call the
habit of patriotism. A city without patriots can never be anything
but a confederacy of convenience with no more permanence than
the changeable economic interests that hold it together. It is
therefore essential, in Aristotle's view, that the founders of a city,
and every generation of citizens that follows, take care to ensure
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that their successors possess the proper patriotic spirit, which
cannot be expected to develop spontaneously but requires a long
process of education, of soul shaping, that must be closely supervised from the start. This is why Aristotle's account of politics
leads naturally to a discussion of education, a topic that in fact
receives more attention than any other in his treatise.
For Aristotle, then, the human soul needs civic life and without
it remains unfulfilled and incomplete. And civic life, in turn, needs
properly trained souls that have acquired, through their education,
the habit of patriotism or political love. These two ideas are
central to Aristotle's political philosophy and to the long tradition
of republican thought that is founded upon it. But in the seventeenth century a new tradition of thought arose that deliberately
challenged these ideas. Often called the "contractarian" tradition
because it seeks to defend the political arrangements of human
beings as the outcome, real or imagined, of a pre-political agreement among those living under these arrangements, this new line
of thought starts with Hobbes and Locke and has had distinguished
defenders in every subsequent period, including our own.
The contractarian view of politics, which fit so well the
emergent system of nation states in early modern Europe and the
dynamic forms of capitalist enterprise that were simultaneously
transforming Europe's age-old economic order, repudiates the
republican conception of politics in two crucial respects. First,
contractarianism depicts the whole realm of politics in purely
instrumental terms, as a device for pacifying the world so that its
human inhabitants can continue to pursue, as safely and cheaply as
possible, the truly important, non-political activities in which they
are engaged. Political life, on the contractarian view, is not an
arena of self-fulfillment in which essential human powers are
developed and deployed; it is not, as it is for Aristotle, a source of
intrinsic satisfaction in a complete human life. It is merely a
condition, albeit a necessary one, for achieving such satisfaction,
which is only to be found in activities, material or spiritual, of a
non-political kind. The claim that politics is of instrumental value
only, that it is merely a means to an end and not an end in itself,
marks the first great point of conflict between the contractarian and
republican traditions of thought.
The second concerns the nature of political cohesion, the force
that holds political communities together. A city will survive, on
Aristotle's view, only if some of its citizens are devoted to it, only
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if they love it and are prepared to sacrifice themselves on its behalf.
The great contractarian philosophers of the seventeenth century
claimed, by contrast, that commonwealths are held together by selfinterest, not patriotic love. Individuals, they said, can see the
advantages of forming commonwealths and of remaining in them
once established by looking to their private welfare alone; no other
motive is needed to produce a widespread habit of law-abidingness
and the political cohesion that flows from it, and no other, they
insisted, is sufficiently powerful to achieve this result. On a
contractarian view, states are held together not because their
citizens care most intensely about something other than themselves,
but precisely because they care so exclusively about their own wellbeing and recognize that it is best secured by behaving as the law
requires. It follows, as Hobbes openly conceded, that when a
political association asks its members to risk their lives in order to
protect it, their motives for law-abidingness come to an end and
they have no duty to comply, which is to say they have no duty to
be patriots, for the willingness to take such risks is the standard by
which all patriotism must finally be measured. And it also follows
from the contractarian view of political cohesion that no scheme of
education is required to achieve it since the passion of self-interest
that holds states together is a natural feeling anterior to any
educational experience and not, like the habit of patriotic love, an
affect acquired only through a process of long and careful cultivation. It is revealing, in this regard, that while Aristotle devotes a
large portion of his treatise on politics to the topic of education,
there is virtually no mention of the subject in Hobbes's Leviathan.
These two traditions of thought, the republican and the
contractarian express deeply different, indeed antithetical, views of
political order. Both were alive in the culture of the eighteenth
century which the founders of the American republic inhabited and
both played an important role in the design of the new government
they fashioned. For some time now historians have debated the
question of which tradition dominated the thinking of the founders
and the constitutional scheme they invented. In the last generation,
the prevailing view was that of Louis Hartz, who saw the American
constitution as an embodiment of Lockean liberalism. In our
generation, the balance of historical judgment has shifted, and
scholars like Bailyn and Pocock and Wood, who emphasize the
republican spirit of the founding, enjoy, for the moment, a greater
prestige than their rivals. But this rivalry can never be settled, and
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there will always be defenders of each view, because our constitution is a composite of elements drawn from different traditions and
joined in a permanently volatile mix.
Just as the view we take of our political system oscillates
between republican and contractarian extremes, so too does our
view of the legal profession. There are, in fact, two opposing ways
of describing the American lawyer's role and responsibilities, one
that starts from republican and the other from contractarian
premises. Each description yields a sharply different view of what
lawyers do and ought to do, of their function and duties in the
American political system. Though each pretends to be a complete
account, neither, in the end, can be, for the nature of the American
legal profession, like that of the larger society it serves, has from
the start been defined, with a kind of moral schizophrenia, partly
in republican and partly in contractarian terms. This schizophrenia
is the source of a permanent division in our thinking about the
legal profession, and many of the most familiar dilemmas of legal
ethics, which can be restated with endless variety but never really
solved, trace their origins to it.
The republican conception of the American legal profession
might be said to begin with Madison's celebrated solution to the
problem of factionalism, a solution he famously described as "a
republican cure for a republican disease." The problem of political
factions was a central difficulty for classical republicanism and
Madison proposed to solve it, in effect, not by limiting its scope (as
earlier writers had proposed) but by broadening it instead, by
encouraging a wider range and a greater variety of factions, in the
belief that their competition would prevent the dominance of any
one faction over all the others - the chief evil to be avoided. In
Madison's view, a continental republic, instead of being an
oxymoron as others had insisted, offered, in fact, the key to solving
one of republicanism's most challenging problems. At the same
time, however, it created a new difficulty that anyone committed to
the republican tradition had to take quite seriously. For the very
broadening of the political realm that reduced the dangers of
factionalism was bound simultaneously to lengthen the cord by
which each citizen was attached to the republic and thereby to
weaken the spirit of patriotic devotion on which, all republican
thinkers agreed, the survival of every political association depends.
In a Madisonian republic of continental scale, there might be,
perhaps, episodic bursts of patriotic feeling, but these, he guessed,
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would likely be as thin as they were wide, and a source less of
stability than disorder. Where, in such a republic, might a stable
repository of such feeling be found? No true republican could rely
on the interplay of factions to provide a complete substitute for
patriotism, but where, in a continental iepublic, might a spirit of
patriotism, of selfless public-spiritedness, be nurtured and conveyed
from one generation to the next?
One answer to this question, which gained currency during the
first half-century after the founding, portrayed lawyers as a
particularly important source of public-spiritedness in a large and
fractious republic. The groups classically associated with a special
devotion to the public good had always been defined in hereditary
or pecuniary terms, as an aristocratic or oligarchic class. The idea
that patriotism might be linked to a person's professional role
rather than his parentage or wealth was a new one, but in a country
without an aristocracy and rapid fluctuations of wealth, the notion
of such a linkage held out the only hope of securing what, on a
republican view, still seemed a vital condition of political life.
Tocqueville, Durkheim and others have since made this idea
familiar, but it was to begin with a republican invention, adapted
to American conditions, and its first and most natural application
was to the profession of law.
The training lawyers receive, and the role they play in
administering the law, give them, republican writers argued, a
respect for the law and a devotion to it that other pursuits do not
encourage to the same degree. Because of this, it was claimed,
lawyers are particularly likely to possess an attitude of publicspiritedness and uniquely well-positioned to carry this attitude into
the wider sphere of private, and especially commercial, life, where
self-interest is strongest and contractarian norms are widely
embraced. According to this view, which still has many defenders
today, lawyers are both well-suited and temperamentally inclined
on account of their professional experience to play a leading role
in the affairs of their community, forming its most reliable class of
patriots and sharing a devotion to the public good that serves as a
counterweight to more widespread habits of self-interest whose
dominance is always a threat to political stability as republican
theory conceives it.
There is, of course, another view of the legal profession, one
that starts from contractarian premises. For the contractarian, the
legal order is merely a modus vivendi and no one's self-sacrificing
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devotion is required to sustain it. All citizens are private individuals seeking merely to advance their own self-interest within the
limits of the law, which they respect solely for reasons of selfinterest too. In any even moderately developed legal system,
however, the number and complexity of norms quickly outgrows
the capacity of most citizens to comprehend. A need therefore
arises, even in a strictly contractarian community, for a class of
experts, well-versed in the law, who can assist their fellow citizens
in navigating the shoals and channels of the legal order. This is the
role that lawyers play on a contractarian view of their function.
Lawyers help clients pursue their self-interest by providing the legal
expertise that clients lack. They do not bring to this task a
devotion to the public good, much less force it upon their clients.
From time to time, a lawyer may remind his client that he must
obey the law, but only because it is in the client's interest to do so.
In this respect, as in all others, a lawyer takes his client's selfinterest for granted, treating it in the same way the client does, as
the sole basis of his value judgments, and merely supplying the
expertise which the client needs in order to pursue his self-interest
as effectively as possible within a complex legal system. On this
contractarian view of the lawyer's function, lawyers are no more
public-spirited than their clients. They possess a greater knowledge
of the law's requirements, but no greater devotion to the legal
order. Seen in this light, lawyers are instruments, pure and simple,
whose only commitment is to advance their clients' interests within
the limits of the law, a commitment that in turn is founded upon
their own commercial interest in a satisfied clientele. This view of
the legal profession, inspired by the contractarian tradition and
drawing moral strength from it, has always had supporters and, like
its republican counterpart, remains influential today.
All that I have just said is well-known, certainly to this
audience. What is less often noticed, perhaps, is that the central
problems of legal ethics are likely to appear in a different light
depending on which view of the profession one takes, republican
or contractarian. Different ethical issues tend to stand out from
these two points of view - so much so, in fact, that the whole field
of professional responsibility may appear to have an entirely
distinct subject-matter when seen from one perspective than it does
when surveyed from the other.
Consider, first, the contractarian view of the lawyer's role.
From this vantage point, questions of permissibility are almost

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:3

certain to seem the most pressing in any discussion of legal ethics.
The principal ethical challenge for lawyers will be to determine the
limits of what they are permitted to do on their clients' behalf. On
a contractarian view, lawyers are assumed to embrace their clients'
own self-interest, and to exert a maximum of zeal in its pursuit.
The only real issue concerns the boundaries of what is allowable in
this endeavor. Of course, that is the paramount ethical issue for
the client as well, whose goal is to advance his interest as far as he
is able within the limits of the law, so that in this respect the
lawyer's ethical situation is likely to appear, from a contractarian
perspective, essentially identical to the client's.
In any contractarian scheme of legal ethics, there will also be
a strong tendency to reduce the notion of public-spiritedness to the
idea of self-interest by relying heavily on the concept of adversarial
justice and the invisible hand arguments that are commonly offered
to support it. A lawyer serves the public good, these arguments all
claim, by serving his client as zealously as possible, just as, in Adam
Smith's famous image, the baker serves society by looking to the
profits of his business. In each case, it is said, the public good is
promoted not by seeking to advance it directly, but through
indirection, by many individuals separately pursuing their own selfinterest instead. The great attraction of all such arguments, from
a contractarian point of view, is that they effectively eliminate the
tension between public-spiritedness and private interest that
republicanism takes for granted and from which it derives much of
its appeal as a conception of government and law. For a contractarian, the idea of adversarial justice, of a system of laws in which
the universal pursuit of self-interest, by clients and lawyers alike,
produces a collective good that no one needs to think about, much
less to actively pursue, is likely to seem a compelling response to
the republican's insistence on the need for a patriotic class, and a
brilliant device for transmuting public actions into private ones.
Traditionally, this idea has been most often invoked, and most
forcefully defended, in the field of criminal law, so that contractarians tend naturally to take criminal lawyers - and criminal
defense lawyers in particular - as their model in thinking about
legal ethics, and to view the dilemmas that all lawyers face, and the
meaning of public-spiritedness in the profession generally, in this
light.
Even though a contractarian view of the lawyer's role sharply
reduces the conflict between zealous representation of clients, on
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the one hand, and promotion of the public good, on the other, two
other sorts of conflict remain and within a system of legal ethics
founded upon contractarian principles these become dominant
concerns whose centrality gives this system its distinctive character.
The first of these arises because most lawyers have more than one
client. The idea that a lawyer serves the public good by promoting
his clients' interests with maximum zeal does not eliminate - if
anything, it exaggerates - conflicts among these interests themselves. Even within a contractarian model of law practice, a lawyer
will have multiple allegiances to the interests of his clients, and it
becomes an important task of legal ethics, on this model, to help
lawyers settle conflicts among these allegiances when they arise.
Today, in many law firms, this is all that legal ethics means.
A second conflict arises, even for the contractarian, from the
fact that a lawyer's own self-interest is linked to, but also, in one
crucial way at least, distinct from his client's. A lawyer steps into
his client's shoes and makes the client's interests his own, but he
does not do this from love. He does it for a fee. The lawyer is in
the business of being a friend, and from the vantage point of his
own self-interest, zealous promotion of the client's welfare has only
instrumental value, whereas for the client this is of course an end
in itself. Because the lawyer's self-interest is thus parasitic upon,
but separate from, the client's own - in the same way that the
baker's self-interest is parasitic upon but separate from his
customers' - there is always a danger, from the client's point of
view, that the lawyer he has hired will give him less than has been
bargained for. In every contractual relationship, this one included,
the parties have an incentive to cheat or skimp if they can do it
without detection. All of the rules dealing with lawyers' fees (from
the simple prohibition against theft to the more complicated rules
regarding contingent compensation) are addressed to this problem,
which remains - which indeed becomes especially severe - in a
contractarian system of legal ethics that gives so much weight to
the notion of self-interest. Within such a system, the regulation of
fees is thus likely to be a particularly prominent topic, along with
the resolution of conflicting commitments to clients.
What are the main features of the conception of legal ethics
that emerges from a republican point of view? First, it will tend to
have a more aspirational tone. The leading question here will not
be, "what is the maximum that a lawyer is permitted to do within
a system of laws?", but rather, "what are the ideals toward which
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lawyers should aspire and how can these be achieved?" A republican legal ethics will emphasis the obligation of lawyers to be an
improving force, and this in two different ways. It will stress that
lawyers have a duty not merely to advance their clients' selfinterest, to mechanically execute their orders no matter how
confused or inattentive to the needs of others these orders may be,
but to help their clients toward a better understanding of what their
interest includes and in particular to see that it includes an otherregarding moral component whose presence is essential to the
clients' own happiness and fulfillment as members of their
community. And it will stress, too, that lawyers have a duty not
merely to accept the law as a given framework of rules that
imposes limits on their clients' conduct and their own, but also to
work actively to improve these rules so that they better serve the
good of the community as a whole. In these respects, a republican
legal ethics will tend to be aspirational and communitarian in
character.
Because of this it will also tend to take the counselling relation
as a norm in law practice generally, and to give particular emphasis
to the problems that counselling presents (the problem, for
example, of deciding how far a lawyer may legitimately go in
attempting to persuade his client to abandon a course of action
which, though legal, is harmful to others). Indeed, those who see
legal ethics from a republican point of view will be likely to insist
that most adversarial relations can in fact be better understood as
fitting the counselling model instead, thereby narrowing the domain
of adversarial justice, just as contractarians seek to expand it.
Brandeis's famous description of himself as "a lawyer for the
situation" expresses this thought nicely.
A third characteristic of republican legal ethics is its emphasis
on what, for lack of a better phrase, I shall call the importance of
the unrepresented. To have an interest is to see things from a
point of view. It is to have a partial and perspectival outlook on
things. A lawyer's clients have different interests and therefore see
the world from different perspectives. This raises the question of
how a lawyer's commitments to his clients should be adjusted when
they conflict. For a contractarian, this is an important problem. It
is, in fact, the only real conflict of allegiances that he acknowledges.
But for a republican, law practice presents another and more
serious sort of conflict: the conflict between the interest of one's
client and the good of the community as a whole. This is not a
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conflict between two different interests, however, for the latter the good of the community - is not, strictly speaking, an interest
at all. It is not a perspectival claim or partial attachment to be
weighed alongside others, but, in theory at least, a comprehensive
and impartial value that transcends all limited points of view. It is
a comprehensive good that transcends private interests. But from
this it follows that the public good, unlike private interests, cannot
be represented, since every representation, whether of the public
good or anything else, is made - and indeed can only be made from a point of view, which is just what appeals to the public good
claim to overcome. The concept of the public good is therefore an
unrepresentable ideal. For a strict contractarian, the only conflict
lawyers ever face is the conflict between representable interests.
Republicans insist that lawyers also face a conflict between interests
of this kind, on the one hand, and the unrepresentable idea of the
public good on the other. This does not by itself make appeals to
the public good incoherent, but it means that a republican system
of legal ethics must recognize a duty, on every lawyer's part, to
promote a good that no set of interests, however diverse, can ever
fully capture (Brandeis's "situation"). In a contractarian scheme
this duty has no place. In a republican ethics, by contrast, it has
central importance and serves as a constant reminder of what is
missing in every legal representation, of the all-inclusive public
good that cannot be represented at all.
Just as it is impossible to assign one tradition of thought, the
republican or contractarian, a decisive priority in the political
system our founders created, it is likewise impossible to say which
of these contains the truth about legal ethics. Each has considerable force, and can never be discounted completely. One sign of
this is the ease with which the proponents of each view can be
ridiculed by defenders of the other. To the contractarian, a
republican conception of the legal profession is bound to seem
undemocratic, disrespectful of the equality and independence of
persons, the conception of self-important busybodies who are
forever meddling in their clients' business, and who, failing to
recognize that most people want simply to pursue their own private
interests, are seduced by communitarian dreams, which they then
proceed, with aristocratic hauteur, to shove down everyone else's
throat. To a republican, of course, the contractarian view of the
lawyer's role looks equally pernicious: a demeaning and smallminded view that turns lawyers into servile tools, protectors of
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wealth whose work aggravates the perennial tensions between rich
and poor and makes the social order as a whole more oligarchic
and less stable. Each of these familiar caricatures strikes a
responsive chord, and the fact that it does suggests that neither
view contains the whole truth about lawyers.
One obvious reason for this is that lawyers do a wide range of
things, some of which fit more easily within one model than the
other. Lawyers are counselors, advocates, prosecutors, government
agents and judges. They are protectors, defenders, watchdogs and
inventors. In certain of these roles they must act as a contractarian
view as the legal profession requires, and act irresponsibly if they
do not. But other roles demand a degree of republican civicmindedness and cannot be properly performed without it. Proponents of each view will of course emphasize the importance of
those roles that fit its assumptions and expectations best, and
minimize or neglect those that do not, but the range and variety of
tasks that lawyers legitimately perform make it impossible, in the
end, for one camp to sweep the other from the field.
A second and even more important reason why this cannot be
done is that republicanism and contractarianism are both founded
upon moral and political values which, though deeply opposed,
possess a permanent appeal. Contractarianism celebrates the
freedom of the individual and the entirely legitimate wish to be left
alone, to be allowed to pursue undisturbed one's own private
conception of fulfillment. It honors the entrepenurial spirit and
expresses a healthy mistrust of public movements with their
zealotry and conformism. Republicanism, by contrast, speaks to
the human desire for community, the wish to be connected to a
larger public life that goes beyond, and outlasts, each person's
private enterprise. And it recognizes that citizenship involves more
than voting, that it requires a concern for the public good and the
willingness to make sacrifices on its behalf, and affirms that there
can be no citizenship worthy of the name without education.
We are not prepared to abandon either of these opposing sets
of values. Each contains important moral truths, however contradictory they seem. At certain times, and in certain circumstances,
one set of values may predominate, but never in the long run and
across the board. Our moral commitments are just too complex for
that. This complexity is a feature of our political system, which
fuses two traditions whose opposing claims have been pulling us in
different directions from the earliest days of the republic. And it
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is also a feature of the professional self-image of American lawyers,
whose vocational ideals are formed by a similar fusion of these
same two traditions. When we look in the mirror we see a hybrid
whose values are drawn partly from one tradition and partly from
the other, and whose moral contradictoriness can never be resolved
by eliminating either set of values or even by assigning each to a
particular range of law-jobs in a definitive division of labor. We
would have to be a different people, and a different profession, for
that to happen, and the fact that each tradition continues to be so
easily caricatured by the supporters of the other is a sure indication
that it won't happen soon.
Still, though both traditions will always have their place in
legal ethics, and though the tension between them can never be
finally settled, each has enjoyed periods of dominance in the history
of the profession, and it may be that we are now at the end of one
such period, and the beginning of another. I want to conclude by
offering a few remarks about the prospects for transition in our
field, and by suggesting one reason why the change that appears to
be taking place may take longer and be less thorough than its
advocates might wish.
Throughout the nineteenth century, and into the early decades
of this one, republican ideals held center stage in the field of legal
ethics. These ideals underwent many subtle permutations, as Bob
Gordon, in particular, has helped us understand, but, broadly
speaking, they retained their centrality in the thinking of the
profession up through the Progressive Era and a bit beyond. In the
second half of the twentieth century, however, the influence of
contractarian ideas has increased dramatically. One symptom of
this is the changing form of legal ethics, its evolution from an
aspirational "canon" to a "code" and then an even more sharply
drawn set of "rules," concerned mainly with questions of permissibility and the limits on zealous representation. Another is the
increased prominence of arguments based on an invisible-hand
model of adversarial justice. Whether there is any causal relation
or not, it is interesting to note that the influence of contractarianism has similarly increased in the field of moral philosophy during
this same period, through the work, especially, of John Rawls, but
also of Nozick, Scanlon, Gauthier and others.
In the last ten years, however, there has been what might fairly
be described as a republican revival in legal ethics. This follows, by
a decade, the renewal of interest in republican ideas among
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professional historians that I mentioned earlier, and it coincides
with the neo-republicanism that has acquired such currency in the
field of public law through the writing of Frank Michelman, Cass
Sunstein, Suzanna Sherry and others. Bob Gordon's work clearly
belongs to this revival, as does Bill Simon's and Mary Ann
Glendon's. In different ways, David Luban, Michael Kelley, and
David Wilkins have contributed to it, and my own work puts me in
their company. Some in this group have been most interested in
theory, others in problems of law practice. Some have drawn
inspiration from history, others from philosophy. And no two see
eye-to-eye on the meaning of republicanism or its political
implications. But still they form a recognizable group, held
together by the conviction that public-spiritedness is not a hobby
for lawyers but an essential component of their work without which
they cannot do their jobs in an effective and responsible way, and
by the belief that the model of adversarial justice, however valid in
certain respects, is often misleading and always incomplete. These
ideas have been making headway in our field, whose central
problems are today conceived, to a limited but meaningful degree,
in more republican terms than they were ten years ago. Legal
ethics is moving back toward a view of the lawyer's role in which
republican ideas have a larger place than they have had during the
long dominance, in this century, of contractarian thought.
How far will this movement go, and how quickly will it
proceed? My own view is that the republican revival in legal ethics
is unlikely to move very fast, for the following reason. By far the
most powerful intellectual current in American law teaching today
is the law and economics movement. Law and economics has
steadily increased in influence over the past thirty years, and
though it is not without competitors, no other movement can claim
a similar breadth of support, or show results of a comparably
lasting kind. Today, law and economics has a foothold in every
area of law, and wherever it has acquired significant prestige,
republican ideas have had a harder time winning acceptance, for
the economic approach to law rests on deeply contractarian
assumptions. Even in fields like legal ethics, where law and
economics has made only a modest showing, its successes elsewhere
tend to retard the development of republican thinking. That is
because legal ethics is not taught in isolation. It is taught to
students who are also studying other subjects, and their view of the
lawyer's role is importantly shaped by what they learn in contracts

19961

CENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM

and torts and criminal law even though it may not be an explicit
topic of discussion in these courses. There is a debate within the
field of legal ethics concerning the wisdom of the so-called
"pervasive" method of instruction. But this is in some ways a false
debate, for to paraphrase Holmes, the pervasive method is not a
duty, it is merely a necessity. The views that students form of legal
ethics cannot help but be influenced by what they learn in their
other classes. What seems morally plausible to them as students of
legal ethics is necessarily a function of what seems morally
plausible to them as students, period. And because of this, their
views of what is sound in legal ethics is bound to be influenced by
the norms of legitimation employed by law and economics, which
remains today the most potent force in American academic law, as
it has been for more than a quarter-century. So long as this
continues to be true, any revival of republican thought within our
own field is likely to be tentative and weak, given the powerful
boost that law and economics imparts to contractarianism generally.
Whether the law and economics movement retains its present
influence or is, instead, unhorsed by a counter-movement that
effectively challenges its foundational assumptions - feminism
perhaps, or law and literature perhaps, or neorepublicanism
perhaps, or perhaps, most promising of all, a united front comprising all three - will therefore have a large effect on the direction
of teaching in our field, and on our ability to restore some measure
of balance between the opposing traditions of thought that we have
joined in our wonderfully contradictory American venture.

